Economy of Language – form follows function

In his text on the hardest language in the world Jeroen gave a hint to an important aspect of language. In this discussion he meticulously worked out the differentiation between difficulty and complexity. But he also drew upon another distinction, elegantly questioning ideology and cultural narcissism, namely the distinction between complexity and superiority between languages.

As a German I am oddly used to students in linguistics stating that “German is a really hard language” but that this difficulty goes along with the virtue of “being a lot more expressive than English, because the case system allows you to establish much more precise relations between substantives”. And also the political German right wing likes to pretend that the German language and its difficulty bares an element of superiority, only in its pure form of course,  whilst anglicisms and other influences stain our linguistic heritage. Well, there are many good reasons to argue why these reasons are not linguistic arguments, but mere ideological or political matters. In this text I want to further elaborate on Jeroen’s distinction between complexity and superiority.

For this sake I would like to elaborate on the Axiom of Economy, formulated by Achim Eschbach. This axiom stems from what we called traditional semiotics in the very first blog entry of Fuzzy Grammar. In its core it says nothing more and nothing less than: “No semiotic element is ever superfluous in a semiotic system”. This seems quite fuzzy to work with, even for a blog called Fuzzy Grammar. But this axiom relates to what we mean when we say that one language is better than another one, and why we have the impression that better is equivalent to more complex. As I told earlier it is quite common among German linguistic students to think that German is more complex than, say, English and moreover draw a certain arrogance from this. That arrogance stems from the feeling that the alleged  complexity allows to express more things. This is where the Axiom of Economy rules against the comparison of expressiveness of semiotic systems. If every semiotic system has the exactly correct means to expressing whatever is necessary to be expressed (since no sign is superfluous), then how can some language express more things than another language? A language can always express exactly what its user wants it or needs it to express.

This entails two more notions. The notion of necessity on the one hand and the notion of usage on the other hand. These notions are (in a way) two sides of the same coin, since as humans we use what we need and we need what we use. This is not meant as a normative statement. If a person wants to create poetry, this may not fulfil evolutionary “needs” in the way techniques to feeding your progeny do, but the poetry will respond to whatever the poet’s need of expression is. And I take one step further in saying that upon the necessity of meaning, the use of a semiotic system will create the means to access this meaning.

Well this could of course be disqualified as a mere opinion and as belief in an axiomatic expression that matches my ideological background. This is of course true, since an axiom proclaims itself to be self-evident and does not care to provide logical proof. I will still try to state a case, giving some semiotic and linguistic examples of how necessity shapes the quality of economical expression, which makes complexity per se not superior to simplicity.

German writer and publicist Erik Spiekermann (2016) for instance stated in a contribution for Deutschland Radio Kultur that the use of emoticons in internet mediated communication – especially in the case of younger audiences – is a cultural drawback. He claims that it affects not only the communicative capacities of adolescents, but also negates our cultural evolution towards a highly abstract phonetic alphabet. He moreover states that the use of iconic representations of gestures and facial expressions is a threat to highly developed culture, because it antagonises rationality in communication.

First of all, it is clear that written communication does not dispose of the vast array of channels people are used to in oral communication (i.e. facial expressions and gesturing) and that emoticons actually work as placeholders to fill in the void that these missing channels leave in written communication. Writing systems in social media thus aren’t written systems. The distinction between medial orality (vs. scripture) and conceptual orality (vs. scripture) by Koch & Oesterreicher (1985) is of vital utility here. This means that medially written communication in social media is technically a written system, but its underlying structure (if not purpose) is to imitate oral registers of language. And since it is clear that people do not speak the same in every sort of situation, it is also clear that writing has evolved (through its synchronic display via the internet) into an array of communicative situations rather than being one communicative situation in itself. In conclusion: Blaming adolescents of making wrong use of scripture through emoticons is a short sighted view on linguistic diversity and the appreciation of different ways to express oneself. Spiekermann could just as well say that Americans make bad use of the English language, because they have a different dialect from the British or (by extension) that Frenchmen make bad use of German because they speak French, for that matter. This is however a text and socio linguistic argument. In this article I want to tackle Spiekermann’s prejudices and misconceptions on language at a semiotic level.

Other than hostility towards young adults, Spiekermann proves to hold another misconception. Namely that the phonetic alphabet is the most efficient way of communicating through scripture. While I admit to have argued somewhat polemically against points that Spiekermann would probably not defend in such harsh ways, he does explicitly state that the alphabetic writing system is efficient to the extent that the Chinese and Japanese would actually envy European writing culture for it. But in Japan reforms of abolishing characters in their scripture have actually been discussed in certain public environments. The idea was quite what Spiekermann says in that: “’the abolition of kanji [characters] would clear away the remaining feudal mentality and enable Japan to achieve American-style efficiency’; ‘[by] using the Western alphabet instead of […] characters, there would be an increase in national intellectual standards which would lead to maturity as a democratic government and a civilized nation.’” (Fujii 1999)  But the artistic appreciation and cultural identity of character writing were hold in such high esteem by scientists, writers and the broad public that the ministry of culture ruled against it – pride might be in order rather than envy. But also the conception of superiority through efficiency is a rather flimsy fallacy. Efficiency is largely dependent on the notion of necessity, for which the Chinese scripture is a perfect example. A comparison might be interesting here.

The Latin (and also Arabic and Cyril) alphabet enables speakers of a language to give an image to their speech, by representing sounds pronounced in their language. That is, the phonetic chain of Arabic, Dutch, English, French, German, Greek, Portuguese, Russian, Spanish, Slovenian and so forth can be conveniently plotted onto a line from one side to the other (space representing the time it takes for one to pronounce the phrase) imitating the phonetic chain sound by sound (with more or less synchronic accuracy – Spanish being very accurate and Danish little accurate in phonetic representation. Since languages tend to have a relatively small array of sounds (few exceed the 100 sounds mark) but almost infinite thoughts and meanings to express,  the system is efficient in the representation of sounds. A stock of 26 basic signs – in the case of the Latin alphabet – are more than enough to cover the expenses of the endeavour of written meaning making. In the reading of the text what we are actually reading, is a representation of spoken sounds, which in a second step has to be translated into meaning (Figure 1). For a skilled reader this cognitive effort of translating sound back into meaning is of course a matter of shallow processing and people are typically not aware of this process. But one can see in children who barely started reading, how an error in phonetic scripture makes the sense of scripture practically inaccessible, for the child has to read the text out loud to itself, before understanding what is being said.

scheme
Figure 1: Decyphering procedure of alphabetic texts

Chinese scripture on the other hand displays a completely different way of functioning. In the Chinese language a character is not linked to its pronunciation but rather directly to the concept which it is a representation of. The Japanese (lend from Chinese) character for “sun” or “day” might enlighten this process. “日”is an iconic, that is visual, representation of the sun. Although it seems quite rudimentary, it is a squared representation of a round shine of light around a centre  This character can be pronounced in different ways ni, hi or nichi and even more, depending on the context it stands in. So Chinese (and Japanese for that matter, even though Japan does also have a syllabic system on top) do not link scripture to sound, which then leads to conceptual meaning. It links scripture to conceptual meaning and then leads to sound in its last interpretation (Figure 2), namely while reading aloud[1]. Consequently the array of characters has to be a lot more finely grained than in phonetic alphabets, since the human languages uses few sounds to access a lot (everything a human being can think of) of meanings. Also combination and derivation do not really alleviate this issue, resulting in Chinese requiring to know about 5000 signs to practically communicate (over 80.000 attested) and Japanese to requiring 2136  standardised kanji (loaned Chinese characters) upon finishing high school, plus 52 hiragana (these are alphabetic, used for morphology or to replace a forgotten kanji) plus 52 katakana (also alphabetic but used only for loan words). Spiekermann has reason to argue that this is a very inefficient writing system when it comes to learning them, but the argument does only hold true when learning efficiency is the standard or necessity that you are measuring the writing system against.

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Figure 2: Decyphering procedure of character based texts.

The Chinese writing system is from its perspective superior to the Latin writing system in that it fits a need that is historically not an issue for European languages, thus easily overseen in the judgement of efficiency. Empires in Europe where for a long time relatively consolidated linguistically. There were of course empires in which different languages were spoken at the same time like the Holy Roman Empire, but they consolidated its language (on an administrative level) through Latin as the written lingua franca. During the Shang Dynasty (around 1700-1000 BC), which is the time span since when Chinese scripture is uninterruptedly attested, it evolved to a highly functional system for administrative purposes however. China was a vast empire in both size and cultural diversity. Many languages were to be covered by an administrative apparatus that would need to convey messages through all of China. The solution to this problem was as simple as the Latin solution seems to us. The scripture in use had to be a direct representation of meanings, so pictograms (arguably also the predecessor of current writing systems in Europe) did not evolve away from iconic concepts, towards phonology as a baseline, but kept the iconic representation as its main underlying principle. They then developed into a highly differentiated and at first glance unnecessarily complex writing system. Subsequently, Chinese scripture could be read throughout the Chinese Empire, each province’s administration pronouncing the signs in their respective dialect. The actual meaning however was centralized and kept perfectly well, even without actual speech as a foundation. Still today the Han- Scripture (漢字) can be used to write in eight different languages.

The Chinese scripture is the perfect example of showing how a communicative need can shape an entire communicative system. In this context we can also claim that the often judged and criticised use of emoji does arguably fulfil a communicative need that Spiekermann fails to acknowledge – for example filling in missing communicative channels. Our culture typically connotes scripture with high culture, which is historically motivated, but does not match the informational reality of our world anymore, in which (medial) scripture is also used for profane sorts of daily (conceptually verbal) communication. In this specific context our highly conventionalized writing system just falls short to express emotive aspects of communication, which is then filled through emoticons (and other means of representation). But to question this is quite the same as to tell people to stop chit chatting at all.

The important theoretical point of this short discussion to be kept in mind is that the performance of any given system can never be described in absolute terms to be good or bad. The only  way of measuring communicative efficiency (or even success) is against the necessity that it is supposed to cover. Practically speaking, you might retain from this text that language, just like any other cultural fashion, is affected over the generations. And you might want to observe that there is no harm in noticing, that twenty years of difference in a linguistic environment change the needs in communication to such an extent that some forms of speech are irrecognizable to the elder. This does however not mean that communication is impossible. If need be, the system will adjust.

 

[1] I don’t personally know how the allocation of meaning in the human mind differs between Chinese/Japanese and European native speakers. One might think that actually scripture affects the way meaning and vocabulary are stored in an Asian speaker’s mind/brain. A scripture bias has been confirmed for Arabic vs. European people, who do display different habits of looking at visual stimuli, according to the direction in which Arabic and European scripture is written.

Fujii, S. (1999). Review on Nanette Gottlieb: Kanji Politics: Language Policy and Japanese Script. New York: Kegan Paul International Limited/Colubia University Press, 1996. Pp. ix+ 245. Price (cloth) $76.50. ISBN 0-7103-0512-5. Studies in the Linguistic Sciences, 29(1), 167-175. Recuperado el 23th de August de 2016, de http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.188.4358&rep=rep1&type=pdf

Koch, P., & Oesterreicher, W. (1985). Sprache der Nähe – Sprache der Distanz: Mündlichkeit und Schriftlichkeit im Spannungsfeld von Sprachtheorie und Sprachgeschichte. Romanistisches Jahrbuch(36), 15-43.

http://www.deutschlandradiokultur.de/erik-spiekermann-emojis-sind-ein-kultureller-rueckschritt.1270.de.html?dram%3Aarticle_id=357346

Fieldwork on Zaachila Zapotec, by Andrea Ariza Garcia

Zaachila Zapotec is an endangered language spoken in the Central Valleys of Oaxaca, Mexico. In Mexico there are 287 languages (Lewis et al. 2015) and the majority are spoken in Oaxaca, one of the most indigenous areas. In Oaxaca there are two language families –Otomanguean and Mixe-Zoque– and two language isolates; Huave and Chontal. The SIL Ethnologue (Lewis et al. 2015) reports 58 Zapotec languages. Below, Map 1 locates the State of Oaxaca geographically and Map 2 illustrates the sub-groups of languages spoken in Oaxaca.

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Map 1. Mexico and Oaxaca

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Map 2. Languages of Oaxaca

Zaachila Zapotec is an Otomanguean language officially listed by the Instituto Nacional de Lenguas Indígenas (INALI 2008) as ‘zapoteco de Valles, del noroeste bajo’ –Valley Zapotec, lower northwest. This distinguishes it from other varieties of Zapotec spoken in the Valley. It is spoken in different cities and towns (INALI 2008), such as Villa de Zaachila, San Juan Raymundo Jalpan, Xoxo, San Bartolo Coyotepec, San Pablo Cuatro Venados and Santa María Coyotepec.

There are no recent official statistics documenting the number of speakers of Zaachila Zapotec. The latest information on the number of speakers is a census from 1990 listing 550 speakers (Lewis et al. 2015). Zaachila Zapotec does not have a writing system.

Zaachila Zapotec is a tonal language, with a fortis/lenis consonant contrast and a four-way phonation contrast between modal /a/, breathy /a̤ /, creaky /a̰/ and glottalized vowels /aʔ/. Zapotec languages are “agglutinative without being polysynthetic” (Schrader-Kniffki 2008:50). The basic word order is VSO.

Choosing the language
In March 2014, I decided to do fieldwork on a Zapotec language. The criteria that influenced this decision were, first of all, a particular linguistic phenomenon– the vowel phonation types in these tonal languages. Secondly, I always found professionally motivating to investigate under described languages. I knew that some Zapotec languages were in danger of extinction.

Following my romantic and non-realistic views about endangered language documentation, my first language candidate was the most endangered Zapotec language that I could find, Tejalapan Zapotec. However, the linguistic study of a moribund language is quite difficult (see Chelliah and Reuse 2011), so I decided to contact a linguist that had previously done fieldwork on Tejalapan (see Merrill 2009). Elizabeth Merrill told me that 1995, when she did fieldwork on the language, it was already too late for Tejalapan Zapotec.

In order to know the actual situation of some Zapotec languages, I contacted other linguists in the area. At that time, I was considering two languages, Zaachila and Mazaltepec Zapotec. Mark Sicoli and Rosemary G. Beam de Azcona confirmed that any linguist was working on these languages and that some work on them should be valuable.

The access to the field was the decisive factor that made me choose Zaachila Zapotec. After contacting many town halls and linguistic associations of Oaxaca and Mexico, I received a pleasant welcome to my project in Villa de Zaachila –a town in the Central Valley, with a population of 14,000 people. The children and young people do not speak Zaachila Zapotec. One of the youngest speakers in Villa de Zaachila is 63 years old. Spanish is the dominant language. In this town, only 13km away from Oaxaca city, the local government is very aware of the linguistic situation and has created a linguistic revitalization plan. The language attitude of the community was favorable for my fieldwork. Given the enthusiasm showed towards my research proposal, I finally decided that Zaachila Zapotec would be the language to study on my first fieldwork trip.

Fieldwork preparation
The main goal of the field research was to obtain enough data to describe the segmental and suprasegmental phonology of Zaachila Zapotec. The first step in the fieldwork preparation was a linguistic study on other Zapotec languages. Since the primary objective was to describe the phoneme inventory and the tonal system, I reviewed previous descriptions of related languages to become acquainted with what type of sounds to expect.

The second step was to contact other linguists who worked in the field of research. Elizabeth Merrill, Mark Sicoli and Rosemary G. Beam de Azcona provided bibliographies on Zapotec languages. Mark Sicoli gave me access to audio files with fieldwork sessions of Zaachila Zapotec made by the Zapotec and Chatino Survey (Sicoli and Kaufman 2010) stored in The Language Archive (Broeder et. al 2005). With these data, I practiced my transcription skills, I got used to the sounds of the language and improved my perception of non-modal phonation types and tones. From these data, lexical items were selected for the analyses of phoneme and inventories and tonal patterns.

Finally, the fieldwork sessions to collect data were planned. I highly recommend three main books to plan the fieldwork sessions:

1.The Handbook of Descriptive Fieldwork by Chelliah and Reuse (2011)
2.Phonetic Data Analysis by Ladefoged (2003)
3.Linguistic Fieldwork by Paul Newman and Martha Ratcliff (2001)

To describe the sounds of a language, the “basis of phonetic and phonological analysis” (Chelliah and de Reuse 2011: 228) is the elicitation of isolated words. Therefore, the first thing that I elicited was the 200 words from Morris Swadesh’s word list (1952). In the search for minimal pairs, I created a word list consisting of cognate minimal pairs in other Zapotec languages. With that I wanted to test if the phonological differences that are claimed in these other descriptions of Zapotec languages also occurred in Zaachila Zapotec. For instance, from Betaza Zapotec Phonology (Teodocio Olivares 2009), the words that exemplified the distinction between fortis/lenis in plosives, fricatives and affricates were selected, and from The Interaction of Metrical Structure, Tone and Phonation Types in Quiaviní Zapotec by Chávez Peón (2010), I extracted words that exemplified the different vowel phonation types in Quiaviní Zapotec. To find minimal pairs for tones, the same methodology was followed.

From the 28 hours of recorded sessions, there is a lot of data that has not been used in my investigation. One of the biggest concerns was the elicitation of tones. For tone elicitation, in addition to words in isolation, words should also be recorded in a carrier sentence, because articulation is influenced by adjacent segments due to assimilation (Chelliah and Reuse 2011). Moreover, list intonation and pitch contours that occur on the repetition of isolated words can obscure the simple form of tones. Himmelman and Ladd (2008) provide a useful compilation of elicitation techniques for prosodic documentation that were tested during the fieldwork sessions. I prepared short sentences that contained minimal pairs and used the substitution technique proposed in Pike’s elicitation methodology (Pike 1948:7) for discovering tonal patterns.

One fieldwork session was dedicated to record two different conversations. Another kind of data collected were the descriptions of pictures using stimuli from “action cards” by Story Builder (Sardinha 2011) to obtain spontaneous and connected speech. These long stretches of speech are necessary to analyse prosodic phenomena, such as sandhi or other alterations caused by the interactions between the prosodic levels.

Fieldwork sessions
The field research was conducted in Villa de Zaachila, Oaxaca, Mexico, between the 17th of October and the 19th of November 2014. The fieldwork trip was partly self-funded and partly funded by a crowdfunding project. This project is an audio-visual documentary about language endangerment called Fade Out (in post-production). The fieldwork was possible thanks to the Town Hall of Villa de Zaachila who contacted the speakers to participate in the sessions and provided a location. Five bilingual speakers of Zaachila Zapotec and Spanish participated in the fieldwork sessions. Their ages range from 63 to 87. One of the speakers has all his teeth and two of them lost all. Also one of them had minor hearing problems. In every session, I was assisted by my colleague and friend Andrés Santiago who was in charge of the recording equipment. The fieldwork sessions were recorded in video and sound.

In the first fieldwork session, I conducted an interview with each speaker to obtain relevant information about their level of proficiency in the language and their sociolinguistic background. The five speakers were born and raised in Villa de Zaachila as were their immediate ancestors (parents and grandparents). All of them confirmed having learnt Zaachila Zapotec as their mother tongue, but that they stopped speaking it on a daily basis. Spanish is currently their dominant language. The two male speakers learnt Spanish when they went to school, at the age of 12. Both of them pointed out that the socio-political context was not favorable to keep speaking Zaachila Zapotec at school. The three female speakers never went to school and they kept using Zaachila Zapotec as their main language until the age of 20-25. Around this age, their parents died and they were the only people with whom they spoke Zaachila Zapotec. The three women got married with non-native speakers of Zaachila Zapotec. All the speakers had children who never learnt the language. The five speakers use Spanish on a daily basis and claimed to have forgotten a significant part of the language.

Before I started the fieldwork, the Town Hall of Villa de Zaachila provided a location where the speakers could gather to “remember” the language together. Only these five consultants attended the gatherings. In the Handbook of Linguistic Fieldwork, Chelliah and Reuse refer to this particular kind of speakers as “rememberers” (2011: 176), a term also used by Evans (2001: 258). It is a particular kind of situation encountered by fieldworkers that study an endangered language, where speakers have been using a second language for so long they initially fail to use their mother tongue with ease. It may then take a few sessions to regain a relative degree of fluency.

The fieldwork sessions took place from 5pm until 7pm at INAPAM, an institutional building for social activities. This location influenced the audio recordings negatively. The building hosted a flower arrangement workshop at the same time. Sometimes laughter and talks were captured by the recorder. In front of the building, there was a highway that connected the town Villa de Zaachila with Oaxaca City, the main capital of the region. The occasional traffic jams were also a source of noise.

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Picture 1. Fieldwork sessions location

Every session was video and audio recorded. The video camera was a Canon s95. To ensure better audio quality, I used the audio recording device Tascam DR-100 MK II. This external sound recorder can record as a standalone unit, due to four internal microphones (two unidirectional and two omnidirectional). However, I used two external microphones connected to the Tascam in order to place them closer to the consultants and myself. That way, I got a clearer recording than I would get using the internal microphones. The two external microphones were a Shure SM-58 and a Studio Projects Little Square Mic.

In my first fieldwork experience, there have been disappointments, obstacles and mistakes. Next time I will do things differently. For instance, I was never disciplined enough with the transcriptions after every fieldwork session, which is vital to keep a good record of what has been collected and check out what data is needed to reach the objectives. However, I learnt a lot from these mistakes and I can say that this first fieldwork experience has been truly gratifying professionally and personally. I would like to thank the Zapotec community of Zaachila Zapotec for their generosity and hospitality. I am especially grateful to the consultants for teaching me their fascinating language.

Andrea Ariza Garcia.

Sources:
Chávez Peón, Mario E. 2010. The interaction of metrical structure, tone, and phonation types in Quivianí Zapotec. Doctoral Dissertation. Mexico: UNAM.

Chelliah, Shobhana. L. and Willem. J. de Reuse. 2011. Handbook of Descriptive Linguistic          Fieldwork. New York: Springer.

Evans, Nicholas. 2001. The last speaker is dead- long life the last speaker. Linguistic Fieldwork, eds. Paul Newman and Martha Ratliff, pp. 250-281 Cambridge: Cambridge University                       Press.

Himmelman, Nikolaus and Robert D. Ladd. 2008. Prosodic Description: An Introduction for Fieldworkers. Language Documentation and Conservation 2: 244-274.

INALI (Instituto Nacional de Lenguas Indıgenas). 2008. Catalogo de las lenguas indıgenas nacionales: Variantes lingüısticas de Mexico con sus autodenominaciones y referencias geoestadísticas. http://www.inali.gob.mx/clin-inali/html/v_zapoteco.html

Ladefoged, Peter. 2003. Phonetic Data Analysis: An Introduction to Fieldwork and Instrumental Techniques. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing.

Lewis, M. Paul, Gary F. Simons and Charles D. Fennig. 2015. Ethnologue: Languages of the       World. Seventeenth edition. Dallas, Texas: SIL. Online version: http//www.ethnologue.com

Merrill, Elizabeth D. 2009. Embers from San Felipe Tejalapan Zapotec.                       [http://www.sil.org/~merrillb/EmbersSFTZ.pdf]

Newman, Paul, and Martha Ratliff, eds. 2001. Linguistic Fieldwork. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pike, Kenneth L. 1948. Tone languages. A technique for determining the number and type of pitch contrast in a language, with Studies in Tonemic Substitution and Fusion. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sardhina, Katie. 2011. Story-builder: picture cards for language activities. 46th International    Conference on Salish and Neighbouring Languages, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC.

Schrader-Kniffki, Marina. 2008. From Language Mixing to Mixed Language via Purism? Spanish in Contact with Zapoteco (Oaxaca/ Mexico). Hispanisation: The Impact of Spanish on the Lexicon and Grammar of the Indigenous Languages of Austronesia and the Americas, eds. Thomas Stolz; Dik Bakker and Rosa Salas Palomo, pp. 49-75. Berlin/ New York: Mouton de Gruyter.

Sicoli, Mark A. and Kaufman, Terrence. 2010. Zapotec and Chatino survey archive. Max Planck Institute, Archive for Linguistic Resources (access restricted and available on request). Zaachila Zapotec Language Survey from The Language Archive:                     [https://hdl.handle.net/1839/00-0000-0000-001B-A7D6-8@view]

Swadesh, Morris. 1952. Lexicostatistic dating of prehistoric ethnic contacts. Proceedings American Philosophical Society 96: 452–463.

Teodocio Olivares, Amador. 2009. Betaza Zapotec Phonology: Segmental and Suprasegmental Features. Dictoral Dissertation. Austin:The University of Texas Austin.

 

 

Creoles, fieldwork and linguistic theory – an interview with Peter Bakker

Peter Bakker is a Dutch-born linguist active in a number of different linguistic fields, chief among which pidgins and creoles, mixed languages and contact-induced language change. He has also published extensively on Romani linguistics. He is the author/editor of numerous books, which include A Language of Our Own: The Genesis of Michif, the Mixed Cree-French Language of the Canadian Métis (1992), Bibliography of Modern Romani Linguistics (1997, with Yaron Matras), The Typology and Dialectology of Romani (1997, co-edited with Yaron Matras and Hristo Kyuchukov), and Contact Languages: A Comprehensive Guide (2013, co-edited with Yaron Matras; paperback 2016). Some of his other interests include genderlects, language genesis and the relation between culture and linguistic structure. We interviewed him in Aarhus about his work in linguistics.

 Peter_Bakker_picture_2015

Could you briefly summarise what it is you do in linguistics?

As for my field, I would call it ‘new languages’ – how they emerge, either through contact or through a lack of contact, and I try to link the structures of such languages with the way they come about. I started out as a creolist, by chance I should say – I was studying in Amsterdam and all the courses were always amazing and interesting, but that semester there was nothing interesting on offer, so I took a course in creole linguistics, which turned out to be awesome, and I got quite hooked on the subject. The following semesters we had world-famous guest teachers at the time; Derek Bickerton, Mervyn Alleyne, Glenn Gilbert, it was fantastic. My MA thesis was about twins who make their own language, in the light of Bickerton’s theory about children as creators of creole languages. I then did fieldwork on Michif and wrote my dissertation on it. Michif is a so-called mixed language which emerged out of bilingualism in French and Cree. In Michif all the verbs are from Cree and the nouns are from French, and it also has two separate phonological systems, one for words of French origin and one for words from Cree origin.

Despite the initial enthusiasm, I lost the interest in creoles at some point, but recently it came back and we’re now finishing a three-year project here in Aarhus called Cognitive Creolistics, where we try to combine cognitive linguistics with creolistics, but where we look at all sorts of aspects of creoles, such as how they differ from non-creoles, and what historical and social processes give rise to creoles.

Do pidgins and creoles just have a kind of attraction to you, or is there also an element of theory in there? Because the way they come about also has strong theoretical implications of course.

Indeed, and of course pidgins as well as creoles are interesting in that regard. Pidgins are interesting because there you can see how little is actually needed to communicate. Many obligatory elements that occur in most languages are absent in pidgins, such as gender, tense, and so on. And that’s the interesting thing about them; how far can you strip down a language and still communicate adequately?

Creoles are interesting because they are in fact full-fledged languages, but they suddenly emerged out of very reduced input. All of a sudden you find tense marking, plural marking, and other grammatical elements. And many of these grammatical distinctions are newly formed, not inherited from the languages from which they inherited the vocabulary. I find that quite fascinating; what categories do native learners feel the need to develop, and why? There’s also a limit to what grammaticalises and what does not. You would never find a creole with an evidential marker, for instance, or gender. That’s why our project was called Cognitive Creolistics, because we were also interested in the question what sort of phenomena arise, what kind of elements speakers feel they need, when they are lacking in a pidgin. These languages arise in a vacuum, there is nobody who teaches it to them or tells them how it ought to be spoken. It’s a bottom-up kind of development in a sense – spontaneous language planning, without any agencies.

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So you could say that in a sense pidgins comprise the minimum needed for basic communication, whereas creoles comprise the minimum needed for first language acquirers.

Yes that’s a good way of characterising it. And of course there are also influences from the original languages of these pidgin speakers, such as African influences on the pidgins and creoles of the Caribbean, such Surinamese creoles or Haitian, you can clearly see traces of African languages there. But there is much more in a creole that is created bottom-up, without influence from other languages.

So there are a lot of ‘default’ traits that creoles have in common.

Yes. One of the things we did in Cognitive Creolistics is take a lot of traits from many different languages, creoles and non-creoles, converted these traits to numeric values and entered these into a phylogenetic computer program. This program then groups languages according to shared traits, similar to shared DNA in organisms. The result was that, almost without exception, you see that creoles are grouped together with other creoles, against non-creoles, so they really are structurally alike. And that is largely independent from where in the world they emerge and which languages are spoken by the creators of creoles.
Interestingly, sometimes you also find European languages amongst the creoles, and currently I’m trying to find out why that is. You know, in Europe people originally spoke smaller languages like Celtic or Iberian, and only later did we see massive shifts to larger languages like Latin or one of the Germanic languages, from which modern languages like Spanish, English and French developed. It could well be that as a result of such growth we see traces of a kind of creolisation in effect even in European languages.

To what extent does what most people consider to be the holy grail of linguistic, namely the ontology of language in our brain, matter to you in light of pidgins and creoles?

Only in a very superficial way. I have many colleagues around me in semiotics and linguistics who do all kinds of measurements, experiments and brain scans, but I simply didn’t grow up with that. If I were a young student now, I would certainly be interested in that kind of research. On the other hand, I realise it’s very basic what people are doing there. Often people will look for areas that light up in the brain and draw conclusions about it, but you don’t know exactly what is happening there.

We don’t know much about how the brain works of course.

Yes, but we’re learning more and more about it of course. In the sixteenth century people didn’t know all our blood vessels were connected, and then someone discovered that. Right now we are at that stage with the brain, we really don’t know much about what’s going on there.

Your work covers many different topics, but I noticed that much of it deals with minority peoples. Is this something that connects all your interests, or is there more to it?

Well, it’s also endangered languages in combination with language change I’m concerned with. Many of these smaller languages tend to change faster than others, and it’s interesting to see what happens through contact with larger languages. That’s why I’m so interested in Romani, for example; we can assume that it was one language at some point in time, but now it’s spoken in so many different areas with so many superstrate languages. If you look at these different dialects you can learn so much about language contact and change. So my work deals with these two perspectives; endangered languages, and the rate of change and contact influences you see reflected in languages – so no it’s not all mostly about minorities. Then again, I did decide at one point that I would never do anything with larger languages. There’s so many people working on English, for instance, but given the fact that every two weeks or so another language dies, I’d rather work on smaller languages rather than work out, for example, the behaviour of the past tense marker in 18th-century English. If we want to study language as a whole in all its complexities, we need to have a broad view of diversity, so now is really the time to focus on smaller languages.

I also think I noticed an element of ‘educating the masses’ in some of your work. For instance, showing there’s no such thing as linguistic inferiority, and that all people are equal.

Yes, well that’s a good observation. I believe in the fundamental equality of all people, and I think that’s a re-occurring message in my work. If not directly, then in any case implicitly.

When people ask me why linguistics is important, that’s usually difficult to answer. Like all other scientists, we are mainly just curious but ideally we can show people why it’s important. Linguistics is important, but we don’t come up with fancy devices to show for it. What I often say is that we owe to linguistics the idea that there’s no such thing as an inferior language, similar to biologists finding out that homosexuality is just a genetic trait and not a curse, choice or disease.

Exactly, it’s quite important to get this sort of knowledge across, albeit indirectly. Each language is incredibly complex, and languages are so incredibly different from one another. This diversity alone forces you to accept the fundamental equality of humans. You don’t have to tell that directly.  Admittedly, sometimes when teaching I sneak in a message in a different way. For instance, when I teach something about statistics I include a graph that shows a correlation between meat consumption and cancer (laughter). So there is definitely an element of moral in there, yes.

What does linguistics need in your view?

We need people who go out into the field and describe languages. We also need more data-oriented approaches to linguistics, and we need to take data seriously, not mold or select it to fit a certain theory. So theory must be based on data, and data must be taken seriously. It’s a bit outdated now, but at some point you had the generative right-hand head rule for noun compounds, and when a language diverged from that rule, they would say it is in fact a right-headed language and come up with all sorts of transformations to make it fit the English pattern, and that’s completely ridiculous. In that sense English is what Latin used to be during the Renaissance and later on, where people would describe other languages based on Latin; they described the case system, for instance, even if the language didn’t actually have any overt case markers. And now English is the model, at least for some linguists, and I think that’s completely wrong.

Thank you for your time.

The Lingivstisk Samlarbild was taken from Mikael Parkvall’s collection. We kindly thank him for permission to use them.

Description, theory and linguistics as a science – an interview with William B. McGregor

Professor William B. McGregor is an Australian-born linguist who currently works at Aarhus University, Denmark. He has published various books on linguistic theory and Australian languages, these include Semiotic Grammar (1997), Verb classification in Australian languages (2002), The Languages of the Kimberley, Western Australia (2004), Linguistics: An Introduction (2009, 2015 second edition) and Sign Languages of the World: A Comparative Handbook (2015, coeditor with Julie Bakken Jepsen, Goedele A. M. De Clerck and Sam Lutalo-Kiingi). He has written extensively on a wide range of topics which include optional case marking, zero-markers, Australian historical linguistics and Shua syntax. He is also the author of various grammatical descriptions of Australian languages including Warrwa, Gooniyandi and Nyulnyul. We interviewed him in Aarhus about linguistic description and theory.

mcgregor_b_william

Could you briefly summarise what it is you do in linguistics?

I suppose I regard myself primarily as a descriptive linguist – but one who thinks that descriptive linguistics has to be informed by theory, and that it also has implications for linguistic theory. So I’m not just interested in describing in what I see in languages, but also in what it implies theoretically.
Currently I’m working on a grammar of Warrwa, which is a language of the far Northwest of Australia. I began working on it in the late 80’s and wrote a sketch grammar and various articles on specific topics over the years. Now I’m aiming at extending the sketch grammar to a comprehensive grammar. This is then written within the framework of the theory I’ve been working on since the late nineties, Semiotic Grammar.

How did Semiotic Grammar arise, and why did you feel the need to develop your own theory?

I guess primarily it arose due to my attempting to apply Halliday’s Systemic Functional Grammar to an Australian language. The difficulties I encountered led me to refine his theory in various ways. And I guess the work that I’ve been doing over the past 20-or-so years is really within that framework, and trying to develop it in various ways when I address descriptive problems. So for instance, one thing I’ve always been very interested in is optional case marking, how do we account for that? And what is the relevance of optional case marking to grammatical theory?

Semiotic Grammar proposes a multi-dimensional shape to linguistic structures, for example a sentence, where the sentence doesn’t emerge as having a single structure, but multiple structures, depending on the perspective you look at it from. I consider linguistic units to be effectively four-dimensional objects that look different depending on your perspective.

Do these different perspectives also loosely correspond to the different components of Systemic Functional Grammar, and if so, what was your dissatisfaction with this theory?

Indeed, they correspond to Halliday’s components, which he called metafunctions, but somewhat loosely in that I distinguish them in different ways to Halliday – primarily for syntagmatic rather than paradigmatic reasons – and draw the boundaries between them in different places.

There are a number of things that dissatisfied me with Systemic Functional Grammar. For instance, Halliday never worried too much about things like internal consistency and comprehensiveness, which are central to most scientific theories. So I started to develop it in ways that made it more economical, and to make more precise and rigourous conditions on things. Halliday was always satisfied with characterisations that were very loose, whereas in my view it is better to try and tighten things up and get a more rigid specification. Take metafunctions, for instance; for Halliday, different metafunctions were identified because networks of paradigmatic relations turned out, in his view, to fall into components that were tightly connected internally, but showed few interconnections; moreover, they were loosely connected with different structural features. But I wanted to get a more precise connection between these.

Is that where your emphasis on the interconnectedness of form and function in the sign comes in?

That’s right. The way I see it, Halliday was always talking about signs, but effectively refused to acknowledge them as such. He preferred in a way to operate with a theory where the sign has no place, even though as far as I can see it the sign occupied a central place in his theory.

Is this also because he was so function-oriented?

In a way, yes. But he also wanted to move away from loose conceptualisations of function and try to group them into significant types, and that’s where his notion of metafunctions comes in – which I think is one of his most significant contributions to linguistics.

I’m not very familiar with Semiotic Grammar as you know, but the way you describe it, taking the linguistic sign as the starting point, an interest in both form and function.. – apart from perhaps a lesser focus on cognitive aspects, to me it looks rather close to Construction Grammar. Could you point out some important differences?

Well I think you’re right. The construction in Construction Grammar is effectively also a linguistic sign in the Saussurean sense. Now the main difference is that Construction Grammar tends to see constructions as effectively unanalysable, and often doesn’t look at the grammatical structure at all. Sometimes we have grammatical constructions defined by the lexical or grammatical items that occur in them, but there is no real place for grammatical relations as far as I can see it.

It’s even been argued by some Construction Grammarians that there is no such thing as a grammatical relation at all. This is one of the theses in William Croft’s Radical Construction Grammar.

Yes, and on this matter I diverge completely from Construction Grammar. Because I think there are many more linguistic signs there than they would admit. Surely, constructions are in general at least partly analysable, and are also made up of other things like grammatical relations, lexical items, grammatical items and so on, all of which make some kind of contribution to the meaning of a particular instance. To the extent that Construction Grammars, like for example Goldberg’s, brings grammatical relations in, it’s only really assuming the basic sort of Latinate ones like subject and so on, and they have no real place and no effective meaning. So there are some commonalities, but that’s one point where we differ.

Chomsky said linguistics is effectively a branch of psychology, whereas Halliday said linguistics is effectively a branch of sociology. What is your take?

Well, recently I was reading a paper by Dick Hudson, who said that “everything cognitive in language functional, and everything functional in language is cognitive”. Now Halliday’s perspective on this largely sociological, because he believed – at least that’s what he said to me – that we really don’t know enough about the human mind to comment on the issue of the relation between the language and the mind, but we know a lot more about language in its social context. So I don’t think he believed language is not a psychological or cognitive phenomenon, but rather we take the sociological perspective because that’s the perspective that’s most readily available. Going back to Hudson, he definitely believes that language is cognitive phenomenon, but in my view we can have both – society depends on people with brains. So the brain is absolutely essential to language, but it is important to realise that cognition is not an individual phenomenon, it’s a social phenomenon. So the cognitive perspective is both cognitive and social. And the relevance for language is that this duality of cognitive and social in my view structures the grammar of languages. So grammars show phenomena that iconically represent features of interpersonal interaction.

Most if not all extralinguistic factors are ultimately grounded in cognition.

Which would include social cognition, that’s right. One of the objections to ‘psychology’ in this domain is when we think of psychology as what goes in an individual mind, in the abstraction from the social context, which I certainly don’t like, and which Halliday wouldn’t approve of either.

So you’re a functional linguist-

-hold on, I don’t like that label (laughter). I’ve always disliked that label, because it’s not function that’s central to my interest, it’s the combination of form and function. While in practical terms I’m more theoretically aligned with what functionalists are doing, I wouldn’t consider myself a functionalist.

Alright, let me rephrase that. Your work deals with function extensively, but whereas most function-oriented linguists also deal with many cognitive aspects -cognitive linguistics and functional linguistics go hand in hand- as far as I know you, you don’t tend to include many cognitive aspects. Is there a particular motivation for that?

Well yes I think so, because like Halliday I feel like I’m in the dark as far as psychology goes, although I have tried to rectify that situation somewhat over the years. Now that we know more about cognition I feel a little bit happier making hypotheses about certain aspects of cognition in relation to language, but one thing I’ve never liked about theories that call themselves cognitive, like Langacker’s [Cognitive Grammar], is the number of times cognition is alluded to and hypothesised, when one doesn’t really get the feeling it’s any more than plausible. A plausible statement as far as cognition goes perhaps, but a serious gap in actually drawing that association, you know, demonstrating it. It’s very easy if you look at a grammatical construction to come up with cognitive bases for it, but very hard to actually motivate.

A good example of this might be the fact that we attribute unmarked word orders to a cognitive perception of events. So for instance, Agents tend to occur as the first clausal argument because we perceive the event as starting with an Agent. This of course sounds very good, but it actually very hard to prove.

Yes, that’s right. I mean, in all these domains there’s been limited experimental stuff, for instance by looking at attention, but I’m always left with the feeling that the claim sounds plausible, but that’s as far as we get.

How do you foresee the future for linguistics, and where do you think it should be headed in terms of theory? Are there any theories you think are viable or should be dispensed with?

I was afraid you’d ask something like that (laughter). As to where it should be headed, I think there’s a serious lack of descriptive work going on in the world that is theoretically informed. I would like to see a lot more of that, where linguists adopt and test their theories rather than trying to write atheoretical, ‘framework-free’ grammars, which of course are not atheoretical at all.

I think many linguists construe the act of grammar-writing as the first step in the scientific process, similar to observing and gathering organisms as a biologist. So you get the data, and you can always do stuff with it later.

Yes, that’s true. Models of grammar-writing people like Nikolaus Himmelmann propose [where a sharp distinction is made between documentation and description] are presented as though the written grammar is there in the data. So all you need to do is record stuff and you can come back to it a hundred years later and pull the grammar out. I think nothing is further from the truth; grammar-writing is a process of interacting with data, and trying to understand it. And that involves understanding of both the form and the meaning of the linguistic sign. There is no such thing as uncontaminated data that hasn’t gone through at least two minds, that of the linguist, and the mind of the person being recorded. And that’s what makes this task so exciting I think, that in the process of writing a grammar you continually refine your understanding of the utterances that you’ve written down in your field notes. So you’ll eventually understand that some word you wrote down and glossed as ‘father’ turns out to mean something very different from what it means in English.

And you wouldn’t ever find this out if you’re the guy extracting elicited sentences from a database a hundred years later.

Yes, it’s not extractable from the raw data that you’ve recorded in your notebooks. So that’s why I really don’t think there should be a difference between documentation and description.

Something else I would like to see improvement upon in grammar-writing is that we’re still ignorant of many things going on in languages, even in the better-described languages like English. Linguists just haven’t perceived the full range of richness of languages, and I think this is true for other languages as well. Although I think we can say that the grammar of any language is delimited and finite, I don’t think any written grammar has reached the point of being truly comprehensive. I think that’s something we should be aiming for in the future, to increase our order of description by an order of magnitude, and I think this would take us to about the extent of grammars of human languages. I don’t think they’re wildly more complex than that. But we do need to move up from our current 1,000 page grammars to around 10,000 pages, mega-grammars. And then I think we have a hope, or at least some possibility, of having described the grammar of a language. (I say this all with some qualifications, since the target is forever changing; grammar is inherently dynamic – as Halliday put it, every pass through the system reconfigures its probabilities, thus providing the ground for change.)

And a lot of grammar writers are of course heavily influenced by current topics in typology, they tend to include what’s currently of interest. That’s also why I mentioned that many linguists view grammar-writing as the first step in the scientific process, like collecting an organism. They see descriptive linguistics as feeding into linguistic theory, but not necessarily the reverse.

Yes, that’s right. The thing there is one has to be awake to interesting things. And when you’ve found them, to explore them. I think that’s a valuable lesson from McGurk [see McGurk effect], if you find something anomalous, don’t throw it away but explore what it means, its implications.

As for theory, well, I don’t see much future for generative theories; I simply find the narrow focus on certain phenomena of language to the exclusion of others to be uninteresting. But whether or not they will succeed in the future, who knows. I think increasingly linguists are adopting cognitive and functional-type approaches, so there are many more of ‘us’ around than there were in the past. I think this is a good thing, and may be the salvation of linguistics in a sense (laughter).

A paradigm shift?

Yes. But I think the reality is, I don’t think there will ever be single paradigm in linguistics; it’s just not the sort of subject that lends itself to a unified theory.

That might be true for any subject at the human level perhaps.

Yes, I think once you’re dealing with humans, as distinct from physical sciences, you will always have some diversity of opinion. Once you accept this as a fact, diversity of opinion is actually a good thing. I think we should definitely be working within a theoretical framework, but it’s also important to appreciate and acknowledge what others are doing

What I particularly like about doing descriptive linguistics is that you are forced to take a broad perspective on the subject, to be a jack-of-all-trades (while not necessarily being a master of none). You need the knowledge not just of all of the core areas of linguistics, but also understanding of the social dimension, anthropology, archaeology, history, geography, and cognition – increasingly linguists studying small languages are addressing questions of conceptionalisation and cognition e.g. about space, time, colour, number. Language is not a separate encapsulated phenomenon isolated from the rest of human life, it is something that human beings use.

Thank you for your time.

No worries.

WMG

What is a text?

We have talked about semiotic signs and language, but we have not said which dimensions we can talk about when we talk about language. In the 80’s this question lead to the formulation of a linguistic approach (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981) that tries to define what a text is (i.e. when do single signs stop to be single signs and integrate into a text) and how it works inside itself. When asking what a text is, it is quite useless to use length as a criterion, since it would be impossible to define from which number of characters on one wants to talk about a full-fledged text (even though the Polish-German critic of literature Marcel Reich-Ranicki provoked stating that a work which does not exceed a thousand pages could hardly be judged as a novel). So far so good. We are going to try out some more intuitive categories and are going to approach the question of what a text is indirectly, namely asking what “coherence” means. A short experiment might help us out here.

(1a) John wants to visit his girlfriend
Mr. Smith lives in a small village nearby
The vacuum [] cleaner didn’t work […]

(1b) John wants to visit his girlfriend
Mary lives in a small village nearby
The car wouldn’t start […] (Bülow-Møller, 1989, p. 133)

Why can we easily and intuitively judge, that the second paragraph is actually a text about a boy named John wanting to see his girlfriend Mary, which he couldn’t because the car didn’t start? And how can one do so even if the text does not state that Mary is actually John’s girlfriend? And why would one on the other hand just regard the first paragraph a meaningless enumeration of different phrases, even though the two paragraphs only present very little semantic difference? Why is only one of both “texts” coherent? This entry will try to account for the notion of coherence as one of the most important markers of a text (de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981), and how coherence can be achieved textually. This has actually been studied for over 2000 years, since Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1995). It is originally called the art of text structuring and deals with classical rhetoric elements such as alliterations, metaphors and techniques, that make a text both (i) understandable (i.e. well structured) and therefore (ii) persuasive.

To understand coherence, three levels of research are going to be presented: a formal approach, a functional approach and a cognitive approach.

Guillaume_Apollinaire_Calligramme

Is this a text? A calligramme (1918) by Guillaume Apollinaire (1880 – 1918) 

The formalist approach
Formalists like Mukařovský (1932) and Jakobson (1921, 1934) have tried to study the formal use of what we might call “cohesion markers” in language and were mainly interested in boiling down the difference between poetic and standard language to formal parameters. If poetic and standard language were different, there should be a difference in structure. They ultimately come to the conclusion that “The violation of the norm of the standard, its systematic violation, is what makes possible the poetic utilization of language; without this possibility there would be no poetry” (Mukařovský, 1932, pp. 166-7). The poetic use of language is thus highly dependent on a normative use of language and its subsequent cancelation. Hence, the notion of regularity is key in the poetic use of language. Broadly speaking there are two ways of making good use of regularity. Firstly, we can deviate from the normative standard of language by deviating from regularity or, secondly, we can deviate from standard language through unusual regularity. This can be illustrated through an example. The deviation from standard through regularity is quite common and is represented by traditional means of rhetoric such as alliterations, parallelisms, and other regular constructions that would appear artificial in everyday language. Look at the following section from Cat in the Rain by Ernest Hemingway:

(2) Italians came from a long way off to look up at the war monument. It was made of bronze and glistened in the rain. It was raining. The rain dripped from the palm trees. Water stood in pools on the gravel paths. The sea broke in a long line in the rain and slipped back down the beach to come up and break again in a long line in the rain (Hemingway, 1987)

The abundancy of the word “rain”, in addition to other lexical items related to water (i.e. water, beach, and pool) would be conceived as redundant in non-fictional texts. Also, “the sea” is twice described to “break in a long line in the rain”, a fierce parallelism, and combines with the chiasmic structure of to “slip back down the beach to come up and break again”. This represents a cunning linguistic integration of two counter running rhetoric structures, woven into one another – a syntactic fugue’s counterpoint. This is of course only one (though excessively smart) example of how uncommon regularity can be plotted into a text. Simple alliterations and other regularities can also be counted in that category. But there is no finite list of these figures, since norms changes in language and accordingly do the possibilities for poetic violation.

The violation of a norm by deviating from regularity is to turn things the other way around. Here a given regularity in standard language is broken, which is typically harder to pinpoint than the aforementioned regularities. They tend to tie their traces to texts through a type of ‘general strangeness’. Examples are lexical mismatches like personifications: “David agrees, they comment on the good behavior of the summer weather, nod again and pass on, walking in their slow fashion” (Leland, 1983). It is crystal clear, that summer weather does not have good or bad behaviour like a child can. Nonetheless this type of a norm violation is often gone over. The same goes for reactivations of idiomatic expressions. In this case an expression which normally bares a synergetic meaning is reactivated, and puts the primitive meaning of the single elements in the foreground rather than the meaning of the whole expression:

(3) Your heart strikes you in the chest then, and you think instantly aneurysm. You are 135 over 80, and should have had a checkup two months ago. (Baker, 1992)

The use of “to strike” together with heart is quite unusual, since one might expect “beat” in that context. The only acceptable expression that unifies “strike” and “heart” is a “strike to the heart”, meaning to hit something critically at its very core. The parts of this expression are “relexified” here, in the sense that their meaning is turned around (now the heart is not struck, but it strikes the narrator in the chest) and the parts “heart” and “strike” turn back to their original, primitive meaning (the heart literally strikes the narrator). This is easy to overlook, but it nevertheless creates the ‘general strangeness’ of a poetic text. Again, this is not an exhaustive list and just gives a few examples of the two main strategies of creating violations of and through regularity.

The functionalist approach
The question of difference between poetic language and standard language from a formal point of view blends into functional questions of the use of aforementioned rhetoric techniques. Apparently the use of regularities is different in poetic and standard language for the sake of the functions that they serve. According to the cooperative principle formulated by Grice (1975), interlocutors have to obey certain conversational maxims in order to successfully communicate. The core of these maxims is quite simple in that they merely require a communicator to “[m]ake [a] contribution such as it is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged” (Grice, 1975, p. 45). This cooperative principle is functionally disrupted in literature, which is not only accepted but seems to be required, and is done in a systematic manner:

(4) David Ronan and his son Matty. The boy aged five is carrying a large red bucket and a small metal spade. They are heading out to reach the edge of the sea nearly half a mile away, the tide just on the turn. Already small in the distance behind them four or five small children build castles in the drier white sand under the watchful eyes of their mothers sitting gossiping in the sedge-grass of the dunes (Leland, 1983).

The information management of the author here presents a clear violation of the maxim of relevance. Why is the information of the “tide just on the turn” being provided at all, while the narration is still occupied with the description of the situation, the introduction of characters, etc.? Again this is easily overlook in a literary context, since readers’ expectations are quite specific in this situation (Hendersen & Clark, 2007). But in interpersonal communication an interlocutor would most probably ask: “Why are you telling me this? Is the tide going to be important later on?” Likewise, the narrator might make a reference to it later, like one emphasises a detail in the setup of a joke, which is going to be important for the punchline.

The thing to be highlighted here is in any case, that a very specific manipulation of information takes place in literature. One can understate details, or distract the reader’s attention from hints to the murderer in a criminal novel, just to present the crucial facts as the crucial ones in the end. The effect is then to make readers see what has been lurking under the eyes of the reader the whole time. This type of revelation is typical for instance in the Sherlock Holmes-style narration.

We want to give an account of the techniques that are used for this type of information management. The general intention of an author in these cases is to manipulate a reader’s attention through what is known as “foregrounding” (Miall, 1994). The main purpose of foregrounding is to make a story strange (ostranenie) (Ibid.), which is reflected in our examples from before (general strangeness). The techniques to achieve this making strange or foregrounding are on the formal level the ones that were described under the formal perspective. But where does the exercise of formal identification of style elements lead us?

Under a functional perspective we can assume that these compositional elements do not just happen to be in the text, but that they are intentionally located where they are. The precision with which one can pinpoint a variety of formal markers in one single phrase serves as evidence for the intentionality (for intentionality as a textuality criterion see: de Beaugrande & Dressler, 1981) of an author. One might claim this evidence to enable the interpreter of a text to track back the authors meaning intentions through formal and functional analysis. Extending this claim would mean to postulate objective hermeneutics in which the enterprise of interpretation, and the measure of when it is successfully complete, would be understood in terms of what the author put in the text and its ‘correct’ decryption. It is not within the scope of this article to determine whether this idea can realistically be pursued, but we do want to point out that the crucial factor of this hypothesis lies in the encoding of an author’s meaning intentions in the text. A serious verification of the – very appealing – claim of naturalised hermeneutics would have to account for how meaning intentions are translated into formal features and in a second
step, how this can be captured in interpretation. Semiotic tradition however seems to leave little space to this idea, putting forth ideas like unlimited semiosis (Eco, 1990) and the disqualification of a dyadic sign model (Fehr, 2003; Spielmann, 2002), which means that a semiotic relation cannot be regarded as mere encoding and requires a lot more flexibility in interpretation and the coming about of signs in the first place. If the object of our ‘objective’ judgment however is merely the direction of attention, we can uphold that foregrounding is an intentional tool for reader manipulation, which can be formally tracked in a text. Notwithstanding, a question arises from this result: If the use of foregrounding and strangeness is supposed to trigger a reaction in the reader, can the psychological reality of strangeness and manipulation effects factually be tracked in readers? The next section deals with this question.

Codex_ephremi
The codex ephraemi rescriptus, a palimpsest (that is two superimposed texts due to the lack of writing material), is a Greek Bible manuscript (5th century)

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The Cognitive Perspective

We have looked at the technique of foregrounding from a functional point of view, that included both the au
thor’s perspective (the means of manipulating readers attention) and the reader’s perspective (th
e means of tracking back the authors meaning intentions). The scope on this matter can easily be extended to the cognitive perspective. In point of fact, the Russian formalists did so themselves. Viktor Shklovsky first used the term of defamiliarisation in 1917, which is another translation of ostranenie (Crawford, 1984). The term defamiliarisation however implies that a text is not merely classifiable as standard or poetic, but that the reading of a defamiliarised text psychologically impacts the perception of the text. All aforementioned formal traits and artistic elements thus serve two purposes at the same time. They formally distinguish poetic from standard language and are claimed since the ancient Greek rhetoricians to evoke certain feelings in the interlocutor. In Shklovsky’s words:

“The purpose of art is to impart the sensation of things as they are perceived and not as they are known. The technique of art is to make objects ‘unfamiliar,’ to make forms difficult to increase the difficulty and length of perception because the process of perception is an aesthetic end in itself and must be prolonged” (Shklovsky, 1998, p. 16)

It is clear at this point how our introductive question about the difference between artistic and everyday language relates to the cognitive element of coherence. Shklovsky emphasises a key element to our endeavour, namely that making something unfamiliar goes together with a deautomatisation in perceptive deciphering, a psychological effect claimed to be evoked through art at least since Aristotle’s tragedy. But this raises the question: Do the claims on educational or aesthetic – in any case cognitive – effects through the perception of poetic language, with regard to deviation from an everyday standard, hold true under psychological assessment?

Miall and Kuiken (1994) made a psychological assessment of the impact of foregrounding on reading time, paired with a judgment on the strikingness of a text passage. They argued that the psychological impact of a foregrounded passage should be reflected in a higher cognitive load and therefore the reading time in the reader. To find evidence, they chose three literary stories and had them analysed for presence of foregrounded features by two graduates in English literature and the respective author. They hypothesised that the degree to which text passages are foregrounded would affect the degree to which reading time would increase. In an experimental setup where participants had to read a story on a screen, and where they had to indicate when they finished a piece of text by pushing a button, they could ultimately confirm this hypothesis. They therefore suggest that “literary response follows a distinctive course in which foregrounding prompts defamiliarisation, defamiliarisation evokes affect, and affect guides ‘refamiliarising’ interpretive efforts” (Miall & Kuiken, 1994). Hence what Miall and Kuiken claim here, is more than just an increase in reading time. Their way of interpreting their data goes beyond the confirmation of the psychological existence of ostranenie through foregrounding. They claim that defamiliarisation ultimately opens out into an “effort after meaning” (Brewer & Nakamura, 1984, p. 9), an interpretative struggle of the conservative human mind to make the strangeness fit a previously established schema (in the sense of Bartlett, 1995). In more prosaic terms this means that the human mind puts a great deal of effort into ‘putting things back into place’ whenever it stumbles upon something strange in a literary text.

Another way of approaching this is to show the other side of the coin, namely the automated one. What is strange about the phrase “Moses put two of each sort of animal on the Ark”? If you read it several times you will notice that nothing is, except if you are so familiar with the Bible that you can immediately see that it wasn’t Moses, but Noah who did so. This example shows that the human mind is conservative enough to go over semantically deviant information, as long as it fits our pre-existent schemata. Our effort after meaning in this example shows to be hard-wired to such a degree that the opposition Noah vs. Moses doesn’t come into the foreground, since the domain “old biblical person” is enough of a semantic connection for our mind to not confront itself with the necessary effort to get this phrase straight. This is a case of genuine shallow processing in which the human mind just activates the prejudice and does not confront itself with the semantic data.

Integrating viewpoints
What does this mean for the concept of coherence, up to now only treated in the introduction? And how can the different viewpoint be integrated into a notion of coherence? Why is the question of poetic and standard language important for coherence and how can the functional and cognitive aspects of foregrounding account for that notion? Let’s go back to the introductive example (1). Why do we perceive the three sentences about Mary and John as coherent but not the ones about John and Mr. Smith? The juxtaposition of the phrases presents a formal element that helps us to answer the question of coherence on the surface. Both micro-texts consist of three phrases with very small formal deviation. But the semantic shifts made between (1a) and (1b) enable the cohesion – that is, formal congruency – between the clauses. Formally, “girlfriend” does not match Mr. Smith, but it matches Mary, which is why (1b) allows a reader to establish a simple relationship between the phrases, which is absent in (1a). So coherence does appear to depend on formal elements as a condition. This blends into the functional element, described in section three. As such, we dealt with the manipulation of information and the tracing back an author’s intention. The intentional element will now gain meaning. The formal level can give the reader a hint for the further processing of the text. That is, when a reader notices a crack in the cohesive elements, he might just stop inferring intentionality behind the text. In our case that means, that the mismatch between “girlfriend” and “Mr. Smith” can trigger off a reading behaviour that no longer makes the inference that the three sentences of each paragraph in (1) are juxtaposed intentionally. If the intentional level is loosened up, the most parsimonious interpretation lies in assuming that the phrases do not belong together. We are now at a difficult point. The last two paragraphs read as if the functional element is necessarily dependent on the formal element, in the way that certain forms (of which we did not discuss an exhaustive list) trigger a certain inference on the part of the reader about the author’s intention. Earlier we roughly discussed the problem of restraining oneself to the author’s intention in interpretation. But another problem pops up here: The inference on intentionality does not necessarily depend on formal parameters. One can also tell a reader that a text is construed in a certain way, and it will be read differently. Hendersen & Clark (2007) for example supply evidence that shows how participants retain different types of information depending on the supposed nature of the text. They report that their participants retain 20% to 50% more detail if they think that the text is fictional. In a non-fictional text they restrain themselves to core information. This is essential for the understanding of coherence with regards to the functional perspective. If one thought that our example (1a) was a fictional text, they might not discard it as coherent, as we stated in the introduction. A reader might think that the coherent element in the text is still to come. Assumed that s/he would think that the text is fictional, and therefore intentionally strange, it is no longer the most parsimonious interpretation that the phrases of the paragraph (1a) are independent of one another. It was pointed out at many stages of this essay that the reader is actually doing a cognitive effort, be it the understanding of formal elements, the tracing back the author’s intentions, or the effect of the readers’ expectations on their interpretation. Our fourth chapter pointed to the cognitive effects of the text on the reader, but also on the effort that the reader has to make in the pursuit of the coherence of the text. From this cognitive perspective we might conclude that coherence is not essentially a textual matter, but rather a cognitive matter. Or we can take this even further and say that coherence, as the connection of different entities of meaning, is not even allocated in the text but merely in the reader’s mind. This is surely true from a phenomenological point of view but not interesting for us in so far it does not integrate the other two viewpoints. If we keep this last remark as a starting point we can elaborate coherence as an a posteriori representation of a text in a reader’s mind (aware or unaware), that is still dependent on formal and functional elements. That means that an author, as a communicative partner, has the possibility to manipulate the reader’s attention through the formal foregrounding of elements. The formal level and the cognitive level blend into one another through the functional level. The functional level is sat between what happens in the reader (cognitive) and what the author does (formal), since it is the level that affects the reader, but also allows him to draw inferences about the author’s intentions. Coherence can thus be ultimately regarded as a meta-representation of a successful communicative act. This communicative act can be synchronic or asynchronic, since it integrates the level of the ‘communicator’ and the ‘communicatee’ and largely depends on a communicative attitude and willingness to understand (and to be understood) on both sides.

 

Sources
Aristotle. (1995). Rhetorik. Übersetzt, mit einer Bibliographie, Erläuterungen und einem Nachwort von Franz G. Sieveke (5th ed.). München.

Baker, W. (1992). Grace Period. En J. Thomas, & D. Thomas (Edits.), Flash fiction: 72 Very short stories (págs. 111-113). New York: WW Norton & Co.

Bartlett, F. (1995). Remembering. A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brewer, W. F., & Nakamura, G. V. (1984). The Nature and Functions of Schemas. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Center for the Study of Reading. Washington D.C.: The National Institute of Education.

Bülow-Møller, A. M. (1989). The textlinguistic omnbibus: A survey of methods for analysis. Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag Arnold Busck.

Crawford, L. (1984). Viktor Shklovskij: Différance in Defamiliarization. Comparative Literature(36), 209-219.

de Beaugrande, R.-A., & Dressler, W. U. (1981). Einführung in die Textlinguistik. Berlin: de Gruyter.

de Saussure, F. (2003). Linguistik und Semiologie – Notizen aus dem Nachlass. Texte, Briefe und Dokumente (1a ed.). (J. Fehr, Ed., & J. Fehr, Trad.) Frankfurt a.M: Suhrkamp.

Eco, U. (1990). The Limits of Interpretation. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.

Grice, P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. En P. Cole, & J. L. Morgan, Syntax and Semantics (Vol. 3: Speech acts, págs. 41-58). New York: Academic Press.

Hemingway, E. (1987). A Cat in the Rain. En The Complete Short Stories of Ernest Hemingway: The Finca Vigia Edition (págs. 129-131). New York: Scribner.

Hendersen, D. J., & Clark, H. (2007). Retelling narratives as fiction or nonfiction. En D. S. McNamara, & J. G. Trafton (Ed.), Proceedings of the 29th Annual Cognitive Science Society (págs. 353-358). Cognitive Science Society.

Jakobson, R. (1921). Die neueste russische Poesie. En W.-D. Stempel (Ed.), Texte der russischen Formalisten (Vol. 2nd, págs. 18-135). München: Fink (1972).

Jakobson, R. (1934). Was ist Poesie? En R. Jakobson, Poetik. Ausgewählte Aufsätze 1921-1971 (págs. 67-82). Frankfurt a.M. : Suhrkamp (1979).

Leland, J. (1983). The Last Sandcastle. En J. Leland, The Last Sandcastle (págs. 89-93). Dublin: O’Brien Press.

Miall, D. S., & Kuiken, D. (1994). Foregrounding, Defamiliarization, and Affect Response to Literary Stories. Poetics(22), 389-407. Recuperado el 06 de June de 2016, de https://www.ualberta.ca/~dmiall/reading/foregrd.htm

Mukařovský, J. (1932). Standard Language and Poetic Language. En J. Vachek, & L. Duskova, Praguiana: Some Basics and Less Known Aspects of the Prague Linguistic School (págs. 165-186). Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamin (1983).

Shklovsky, V. (1998). Art as Technique. En J. Rivkin, & M. Ryan, Literary Theory: An Antology (págs. 15-21). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.

Spielmann, T. (2002). Die Irreduzibilität der triadischen Zeichenrelation – Eine Studie zu Charles Sanders Peirce Programm einer dreistilligen Semiotik. München: Grin.

 

The hardest language in the world – what are we talking about when we talk about complexity?

I recently came across a post in a language-learning community that presented a list of the 10 hardest languages in the world. I don’t remember exactly which languages were on the list the list, but I do recall that all of the languages were well-known, and that the list included Mandarin, Japanese and Danish. Sure, both Japanese and Mandarin work very differently from English in many domains, and use scripts (or a variety thereof, in the case of Japanese) that can take years to fully master. And sure, Danish phonology is a tough nut to crack by just about any standard. But surely, the 10 hardest languages in the world wouldn’t be, by some coincidence amongst those well known to us?

I thought I could name 10 languages off the top of my head that were all demonstrably harder than the languages on the list and flirted with the idea of sharing this in the comment section. I didn’t, because, as I immediately realised, my comment would be snowed under by other candidates for ’world’s hardest language’ – it was in fact French, one of them claimed, while another insisted it was Norwegian. As a rule I do not take part in internet discussions, especially when people claim Norwegian is the hardest language in the world. But it did give me the urge to clarify what constitutes a ‘hard’ language, and why establishing a realistic top ten of such languages would be notoriously difficult, if not impossible in and of itself. This post is about the difficulty with difficulty as a concept. While a number of readers were undoubtedly hoping for a simple and exciting answer, I claim that the question ultimately cannot be answered. I also argue that complexity is a more workable term than difficulty, and that (contrary to popular belief among linguists) some language are indeed more complex than others.

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What is difficulty?
There is a difference between difficulty, which is a tricky concept in and of itself, and overall complexity. In quantifying difficulty, which is more about language learning, it ultimately depends on factors like talent, intelligence, memory, and so on how quickly one masters a second language. Moreover, the closeness of a language to your mother tongue in terms of vocabulary and structure matters as well. We at Fuzzy Grammar tend to communicate in English, but can easily speak our own language to one another without ever having to put much effort into learning each other’s language (we are Dutch and German respectively). For the average Turkish immigrant, however, learning Dutch or German is a daunting task. Likewise, Koreans are often baffled by how easy it is for Turkish immigrants to learn their language – Korean and Turkish are not demonstrably related, but do share many structural features such as SOV word order, strong agglutination and vowel harmony. We should therefore not work with difficulty as a notion, but with the complexity of a language, which is a potentially absolute concept (note: Trudgill 2001: 371-2 does in fact, surprisingly, seem to collapse difficulty into complexity).

What is complexity?
According to John McWhorter, “an area of grammar is more complex than the same area in another grammar to the extent that it encompasses more overt distinctions and/or rules than another grammar” (McWhorter 2005: 45; 2001: 136-7). It can mean, for instance, that a language has many marked phonemes or complex phonological rules. English, for example, has three plural allophones (ignoring pairs like mousemice and ox-oxen for the sake of convenience): /ᵻz/, /z/ and /s/, depending on the preceding sound. Dutch only has two: /s/ and /ən/. English is therefore more complex in this domain than Dutch, but less complex than, say, Tiv, which has more than 10.

It can also be that a language has more syntactic rules than another. German and Dutch are known for their unusual alternation between SVO word order in main clauses and SOV with a V2-rule in subordinate clauses. In most languages, there is little or no difference, so these languages are less complex in that particular domain than German and Dutch.

Another source of complexity is additional obligatory grammatical categories. Many South-American languages have obligatory evidentiality markers, the choice of which to use depends on the information source of the expressed proposition. Any language with such evidentiality markers is more complex than a hypothetical language that is exactly the same, except for lacking these markers.

But how do we measure complexity? More analytically than by using simple comparisons, of course. There is no generally accepted metric to measure complexity, but a number of attempts at making one have been made. McWhorter (2001) claims that creoles are simpler than non-creoles, but uses no metric and bases this primarily on a comparison between Tsez and Saramaccan. This is an unfortunate choice: while Saramaccan is arguably representative for most creoles, Tsez is a notoriously complex language. Parkvall (2008) uses a simple metric to measure the complexity of a large number of languages, partly as a response to McWhorter, and shows that it is indeed true that creoles are less complex than non-creoles. Nichols (2009) argues for a survey of complexity and sets out by proposing a rudimentary system that measures complexity.

The problem with measuring complexity is that complexity itself is a human concept and does not exist objectively in nature. Any attempt at measuring complexity therefore relies on our perception of the phenomenon, and no god-given, ’true metric’ really exists. While I do think complexity is a real thing, I think it is notoriously difficult to quantify. Take the example of Dutch vs. English plural marking, for instance. While English has three plural markers, Dutch has two, rendering English more complex. The English plural markers are very predictable, however: /ᵻz/ comes after sibilant consonants, /z/ after voiced non-sibilants and /s/ after voiceless non-sibilants. In Dutch the choice of plural marking is only partly predictable: /s/ comes after an unstressed syllable, /ən/ comes after a stressed syllable. But there are many exceptions to this rule, more so than is the case with the English plural. Does this make it more complex? Arguably it does. But how much more complex does it then become? How much complexity are such irregularities worth?

Are all languages equally complex?
Before, it was not only assumed that some languages are more complex than others, it was also assumed that some languages are simply superior to others. This idea was particularly popular during the romantic era, where scholars like Wilhelm von Humboldt and the Schlegel brothers considered a richness in forms (e.g. many case suffixes, rich verbal inflection) to be a sign of superiority, quite possibly due to the supposed superiority of Latin. Inherent to this mode of thought was the idea that languages reflect, or shape, the mind of its speakers. While scholars from each era were in opposed to this idea (e.g. the Neogrammarians towards the end of the 19th century), it persisted for quite a while. Indeed, I recently read the introduction to an 1850’s Zulu grammar book where it was stated that “like all backward cultures, Zulus disprefer sentences with many words”. We would at least expect the writer, a grammarian himself, to have acknowledged the fact that Zulu is a highly agglutinative language with heavily inflected verbs, and therefore does not need as many words as English speakers do, as most words themselves are laden with complexity.

It was not until the 20th century, likely due to a considerable (though unfortunately far from complete) decrease in racism, that the opposite idea became popular – all languages are equally complex, just as all humans are equal. In fact, it was the descriptivists in America, which were prominent during the first two thirds of the twentieth century, which assumed that languages did not differ in complexity. As Franz Boas famously said “There are oral languages, but no primitive languages. Each is complex in its own way”. On what grounds they believed this to be true is unclear, but it is easy to see why the idea is attractive; the descriptivists saw language as a reflection of its speakers’ minds, and to state that some languages are more complex than others is then easily interpreted as some cultures being inherently backward. The idea of uniformitarianism has been taken for truth ever since, but since no one has (to my knowledge) ever convincingly shown it to be true, it is worth investigating.

Let’s consider Boas’ statement and the idea behind it first. If we assume language reflects the mind of its speakers, it’s no wonder we wouldn’t want to say anything about their difference in complexity. Although I consider language to be a window into the human mind, I don’t think it’s fair to say that languages completely reflect the human mind. Architecture and dance are also windows into the human mind, but we are completely okay with saying some people build less complex houses or have more complex dance routines than others. Besides, primitiveness is not the same as reduced complexity; it is clear that all languages are able to fulfil their function, but this not the same as saying every language is equally complex. Thus there is a minimum amount of complexity needed for communication, but there is no reason why languages could not be more complex than that.

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A more linguistic-based argument is known as the trade-off; high complexity in one language domain would lead to simplification in another. Languages like Finnish or Latin with elaborate cases systems also have freer word order, a reduction of complexity in syntax is thus ’bought’ by means of complex morphology.

An interesting contribution to the notion of trade-off comes from Bisang (2014). He demonstrates that languages can be covertly complex, which means that what is not expressed by overt forms has to be inferred. Bisang shows, for instance, that in the farmer kills the duckling in English (i) definiteness, (ii) number, (iii) tense, and (iv) agreement are obligatory, whereas in Mandarin none of these are. In Mandarin, therefore, this information has to be inferred rather than expressed. This dichotomy between overt and hidden complexity also involves the hearer, and is quite a well-known concept in linguistics; in Optimality Theory it is called faithfulness vs. markedness, in typology it is known as economy vs. iconicity, and it is also known by Levinson’s (2000) famous ”inference is cheap, articulation is expensive”. Another example of this is the ways languages mark plurality; a language can either mark both plural and singular overtly, just mark the plural (there are very few languages marking only the singular), or never mark number. Obviously, the latter option is efficient and the least complex structurally, but it potentially leaves the semantics of number open to interpretation (to the extent that this is not clear from the context, or quantifiers such as ‘two’ or ‘some’). The first option seems redundant to speakers of most languages, as the presence or absence of a marker, while about as good in distinguishing between two options as two separate markers, is also less economic in requiring additional material to be stored and uttered.

Another interesting addition comes from Hawkins’ (2004: 16-7, passim) efficiency principle Minimise Forms (MiF). Hawkins shows that languages vary in how many semantic roles may be assigned to a certain form. In English, for instance, a subject in the nominative form (that is, not accompanied by a preposition, and preceding the verb) may encode a theme (e.g. the book sold a thousand copies), an instrument (e.g. the key opened the door), or a location (e.g. this tent sleeps four). While in German these all need to be accompanied by prepositions that encode a certain semantic role, n English these examples do not need elements to introduce them, so this is arguably a reduction in complexity. Yet, we are dealing with a complex mapping of semantic roles onto a single type of constituent (subject) here. This was also concluded by Müller-Gotama, who investigated the transparency of subjects and objects in terms of which semantic roles they can take. He found that the less case marking a language had, the less transparent an argument generally was (Müller-Gotama 1994: 143). There is thus definitely some sort of trade-off here too.

What about this trade-off then?
As the previous section shows, there are direct trade-offs in languages in the sense that simplification in one domain results in complexification in another. There are a number of problems, however. For starters, even though we can demonstrate a trade-off, we stumble upon the same quantification problems mentioned earlier. As Sampson (2009) said:

Consider for instance Archi, spoken by a thousand people in one village 2,300 metres above sea level in the Caucasus. According to Aleksandr Kibrik [..], an Archi verb can inflect into any of about 1.5 million contrasting forms. English is said to be simple morphologically but more complex syntactically than some languages; but how much syntactic complexity would it take to balance the morphology of Archi? – and does English truly have that complex a syntax? Relative to some languages I know, English syntax as well as English morphology seems to be on the simple side.” (Sampson 2009: 3)

I agree with Sampson that although there is some trade-off, it’s definitely not true that this trade-off is absolute; there are languages that are simple in all domains, and there are languages that are more complex in all domains. So while McWhorter (2001) did not unequivocally demonstrate that creoles are necessarily simpler than non-creoles, he did demonstrate that one language can be more complex than another in all domains.

Secondly, there also seem to be traits in languages that are mainly (if not only) complexifying, without resulting in reduced complexity in another domain. A good example of this is the gender system found in many European languages. While arguably these served a semantic classifying function at some point in history, today’s remnants do not, and merely serve to complexify a language. Another example is the alternation between regular and irregular plurals, such as moose vs mooses and goose vs geese. When this alternation emerged it served an economical function, nowadays it is merely an irregularity. It therefore also seems to be the case that as speakers of a language we are left with the remnants of previous speakers’ striving for economy without gaining anything ourselves.

Thirdly, Bisang’s (2014) principle of hidden complexity sounds good, but it is difficult to demonstrate to what degree pragmatic inference actually takes place. It is tempting to say that a language that does not have a plural marker leaves the hearer guessing as to what number the speaker refers to, but it is not clear that number is as relevant to a speaker of such a language as it for an English speaker. And that’s a crucial point: when a language lacks an English-type category we say this has to be inferred pragmatically, but when English lacks a non-English-type category we would not. English, for instance, lacks evidential markers, but we wouldn’t say we pragmatically infer where a speaker got their information.

The idea of this essay is to demonstrate, within the space of a blog post, what we mean by difficulty and complexity, and how difficult it is to determine these. I also tried to show that there is indeed such a thing as complexity, but that it is notoriously difficult to quantify and to show exactly how much more complex languages are. While it is difficult enough to measure complexity, I also argued that showing every language displays exactly the same (somehow operationalised) amount of it is near impossible. So unless we can quantify complexity in all domains, and show that languages have an inherent complexity equilibrium, it seems that equicomplexity is more of an intuitive, well-meant idea than one we can actually work with.

As a bonus, here are 5 very difficult complex languages, In at least one domain:

-Georgian. According to some linguists, Georgian has the most complex inflection system in the world. The phonology is no walk in the park either.
-Iau. This Papuan Lakes Plain language has eight different tones that are lexically contrastive on nouns but which denote tense and aspect on verbs, on which they can also be combined.
– !Xóõ. This Khoisan language, according to most analyses, hold the record for the most consonants and the most clicks in the world. In addition, vowels can be plain, nasal, murmured, glottalised and strident.
-Bella Coola. A Salish language known for immensely complex morphology and extreme consonant clusters. The famous sequence [xɬpʼχʷɬtʰɬpʰɬːskʷʰt͡sʼ] ’he has in his possession a bunchberry plant’ is from Bella Coola.
-Archi. This Northeast Caucasian language really has it all. It has well over 70 consonants (as always, depending on the analysis), the vowels can be short, long and pharyngialised, and there are two tones. In addition, verbs can take into over a million forms (see above), and for nouns there is number and there are are 4 genders (although not marked on the noun itself), 10 cases and 5 ’locative cases’ which can all take one of the 6 directional affixes.

Sources
Bisang, W. (2014). Overt and Hidden Complexity: Two types of Complexity and their Implications. In Poznań Studies in Contemporary Linguistics 50 (2). 127–143.

Hawkins, J. (2004). Efficiency & Complexity in Grammars. Oxford: Oxford University

McWhorter, J. (2001). The World’s Simplest Grammars are Creole Grammars. In Linguistic Typology 5. 125-166.

McWhorter, J. H. 2005. Defining Creole. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nichols, J. (2009). Linguistic complexity: a comprehensive definition and survey. In Sampson, G., Gil, D. & Trudgill, P. (eds.) Language Complexity as an Evolving Variable. Oxford: University Press. 111-125.

Müller-Gotama, F. (1994). Grammatical relations: a cross-linguistic perspective on their syntax and semantics. Berlin: de Gruyter.

Parkvall, M. (2008). The simplicity of creoles in a cross-linguistic perspective. In Miestamo, M., Sinnemäki, K., & Karlsson, F. (eds.) Language Complexity. Tyology, contact, change. 265-286.

Sampson, G. (2009). A linguistic axiom challenged. In Sampson, G., Gil, D. & Trudgill, P. (eds.) In Language Complexity as an Evolving Variable. Oxford: University Press. 1-18.

Trudgill, P. (2001). Contact and simplification: historical baggage and directionality in linguistic change. In Linguistic Typology 5: 371–3.

The Lingivstiska Samlarbilder were taken from Mikael Parkvall’s collection. We kindly thank him for permission to use them.

 

LingSem Part 1: Is Linguistics a branch of Semiotics, or the other way around?

It is often claimed that linguistics is a branch of semiotics. After all, semiotics typically involves concepts that have a detectable form and meaning, better known as signs, of which the linguistic sign constitutes only a single type. On the other hand, many semioticians are language scholars and a great deal of semiotic standard works (e.g. Peirce 1903, Bühler 1934) are primarily concerned with language, and many branches of modern semiotics still focus on linguistic subjects, albeit in a specific way. Further, Ferdinand de Saussure is often seen as the father of both disciplines, as his Cours de linguistique générale (Saussure 1916) gave rise to both modern linguistics and semiotics, and he is arguably one of the main reasons these two disciplines are so deeply intertwined. Is it reasonable then, to suppose that one of these disciplines swallows up the other?

A shift away from language 

Semiotics in its most basic form, which we will call Traditional Semiotics here, and is chiefly concerned with what constitutes a sign. This is something it shares with linguistic theories of the sign; both disciplines have their foundations in de Saussure’s landmark sign theory, in which he claimed that a sign is every relation between a signifier and a signified. That is, something that carries a meaning, and something that is the meaning. Whenever one says ‘cat’ the stream of air which reaches my ear is the signifier, while the thing that comes to my mind upon hearing it, the concept ‘cat’, is the signified.

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Traditional Semiotics is however not the only perspective semioticians have taken. In the course of the past decades, the rise of cognitive approaches (the ‘cognitive turn’) in the humanities did not just pass by semioticians without affecting it as a discipline. The cognitive turn resulted in a number of novel semiotic approaches, which we shall call Modern Semiotics. An example of such a discipline is Cognitive Semiotics, which deals with meaning-making as a cognitive effort to make sense of the world around us. This is much more an investigation into the relation between a perceiver and its environment, and is (contrary to language) not assumed to be exclusive to humans. Another novel discipline is Biosemiotics, which tries to understand the behaviour of cells as a communicative process and therefore tries to understand how cells interpret information. This discipline shifts the focus even further away from human meaning-making to communication in general, making communication more like a super-notion concerned with basically any type of action-response process.

It is clear that Modern Semiotics sees a shift from the traditional discipline of semiotics, which deals only with human subjects and categories. For a traditional semiotician, signs are based on concepts like intention, imagination and empathy. Communication, from this perspective, is argued by some to be a uniquely human trait and traditional semioticians have good reasons to argue that human communication is special compared to animals. Modern Semiotics on the other hand tends develops away from linguistics, since language is widely regarded to be peculiar to human beings. It should be mentioned, however, that other contemporary semiotic questions and methods are rather language-based. Many experiments try to simulate primitive communication situations between humans in order to gain insights about the origin of language. Interestingly, this methodology is comparable to a number of recent experiments within linguistics that try to create a communication system through iterative learning (e.g. Kirby et al. 2008).

Different disciplines                  
Despite some degree of convergence between the disciplines, it is clear that semiotics has broadened its scope significantly. Does this imply that linguistics, in its relatively narrow scope, is a branch of semiotics? To answer this question, we should take a closer look at what both disciplines presuppose.

Setting aside divergent sub-disciplines like Biosemiotics for the moment, mainstream semiotics is the study of meaningful communication. By definition this encompasses more than language; things like cultural transmission, visual signs, films and art, all of which are objects of inquiry in at least some area of semiotics, can arguably be subsumed under ‘signs’ or a system thereof, but neither of these would in itself be an object of inquiry for a linguist. As a sign is anything that has both a formal component and a meaningful component, these concepts are all (composed of) signs – and since language is a system of signs, it is one system among many. So indeed, broadly construed, linguistics is swallowed up by semiotics in terms of range. There are however some different presuppositions between the respective fields that complicate the picture.

Firstly, the fact that linguistics is a part of semiotics is dependent on the assumption that language is a system of signs. Many disciplines within the study of linguistics do not assume this, chief among which Generative Theory, which excludes any judgment about the concept of language as a sign system. Many, if not most other linguistic disciplines do not deal with signs explicitly, although their conclusions are not necessarily incompatible with disciplines that do. We have never seen the sign mentioned explicitly in sociolinguistics, for instance, but it does study the behaviour of a sign in a social context (regardless of the researcher’s conceptions, if language is a system of signs, and language is the object of inquiry, the researcher is a student of a system of signs). In fact, it was only fairly recently, partly as a response to formalist approaches, that sign-based theories started to re-emerge.[1]

Furthermore, even if linguists and semioticians are both students of the sign, they maintain different objects of inquiry and different methodologies. Semiotics is in a sense closer to language philosophy in that it often inquires “what it means to mean something”, e.g. the connection between meaning and reality, and what it means, philosophically speaking, to be familiar with a certain meaning. It is clear that this approach is much more strongly focussed on the construction of meaning. By contrast, linguists are exclusively interested in signs as a communicative vehicle between people. This is of course grounded in the idea that only humans are capable of communicating through language, and it is much more an investigation into why and how humans are able to communicate the way they do than an investigation into the nature of the sign as a concept.

This is a very important difference between the approaches; in the linguistic sense, signs are always arbitrary in the sense that they consist of elements that are meaningless on their own (phonemes), but which can be combined to form meaningful expressions. This process is called duality of patterning (originally called double articulation by Martinet [1949, 1960]) and is often argued to be a property that is only found in human language. The communication of bees, in which the approximate distance and location of a food source is conveyed, does not fall under the linguistic sign system because the types of movement found in a bee dance actually represent something indexically (i.e. by means of a sophisticated pointing mechanism), and the scent of what is represented is physically carried and communicated by the bee (Bühler 1927). This is another fundamental difference to human communication; we don’t emit a fruity scent when saying ‘banana’. As long as signs stand for something, there is a strict limit to what can be conveyed, hence human language is taken to be infinite and other types of communication are taken to be finite. (Whether or not it is true that human language is finite, as well as whether there is indeed a fundamental difference between linguistic signs and other signs, will be left an open matter. Here we only strive to point out the difference in tradition.)

Semioticians are also interested in the relation between our environment and our consciousness within this environment. This means that any type of thing that has a formal side and a meaning side is of potential interest: natural signs (e.g. smoke indicating fire), intentional communication of any kind, as well as unintentional communication such as body language. Linguistics differs from this approach, in that it primarily focusses on human cognition and all that comes with it – social relations, memory, psychology, etc., inasmuch as it is intertwined with language comprehension and language use.

Signs in the linguistic sense are conventionalised signs used as communication devices, and semiotic signs also include unintentional signs, which may or may not be communicative vehicles, and in some cases also natural signs, which are never communicative vehicles. This also explains the shift away from human language in some branches of semiotics; if a sign does not have to be intentional to be studied, there is no reason why other types of sign should be excluded. It also explains the broader, “what-it-means-to-mean-something” type of approach that typifies much of semiotics; if signs are ubiquitous and potentially unintentional, the nature of this sign (including its relation to the world) is perhaps more interesting than what it is used for by human beings. In our view, human intentional and unintentional signs arguably fall under a broader notion of meaning-making – human signs are all subject to human interaction and psychology, and studying both intentional and unintentional signs renders the field an investigation into human communication. Including natural signs implies a radical shift away from this notion.

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Conclusion
Linguistics is thus a subdiscipline of semiotics inasmuch as semiotics covers a range of phenomena that includes language. This does not automatically render it a subdiscipline, however. For example, both semiotics and linguistics ultimately depend on beta-branches. Indeed, probably everything can ultimately be explained by particles, but no one would say semiotics is really just a subdiscipline of particle physics. For a discipline to be part of another there should be sufficient overlap in object of inquiry, assumptions, and methodology. It is especially in these domains that linguistic tradition contrasts with the semiotic tradition.

The more neatly defined linguistic object of inquiry goes hand in hand with more precise descriptions, and these fine-grained descriptions also give way to fine grained methods. Tracking back the phonology of a word is surely a more precise and methodologically ‘cleaner’ task than tracking the history of a recurring symbol in an art tradition. And we know quite a bit about the different faculties that compose language, for it is not only a system, but also a psychological capacity, which is in turn made up from many different abilities. If language is a system of signs grounded in cognitive aspects of human life -including social, psychological, and cultural phenomena – we need to study different types of sign systems pertaining to different aspects of human life, some which pertain to semiotics rather than linguistics. On the other hand, language is arguably the most regular and structured sign system of all, and also the most prominent of traits setting us apart from non-humans, so it is no wonder semioticians have focussed on language to such a large extent. In all, linguistics and semiotics need one another, but if you ask us, one does not unequivocally belong to the other.

[1] Some examples include Systemic Functional Grammar (e.g. Halliday 1961), Semiotic Grammar (McGregor 1997) and Construction Grammar (e.g. Goldberg 1995, Croft 2001).

Sources
Bühler, K. (1927). Die Krise der Psychologie. Jena: Gustav Fischer.

Bühler, K. (1934). Sprachtheorie. Die Darstellungsfunktion der Sprache. Jena: Gustav Fischer.

Croft, W. A. (2001). Radical Construction Grammar: Syntactic Theory in Typological Perspective. Oxford: University Press.

Saussure, F. de (1916). Cours de linguistique générale. (C. Bally, & A. Sechehaye, Hrsg.) Paris: Payot.

Saussure, F. de (1975). Linguistik und Semiologie. (J. Fehr, Hrsg.) Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.

Eco, U. (1990). I limite dell’interpretazione. Milano: Bompiani.

Goldberg, A. (1995) Constructions: A Construction Grammar Approach to Argument Structure. Chicago: University Press.

Halliday, M.A.K. (1961). Categories of the Theory of Grammar. In Word 17 (3). pp241-92. Reprinted in Full in On Grammar: Volume 1 of the Collected Works of M.A.K. Halliday. London and New York: Continuum.

Kirby, S., Cornish, H. & Smith, K. (2008) Cumulative cultural evolution in the laboratory: an experimental approach to the origins of structure in human language. In PNAS 105. 10681–10686.

Martinet, A. (1949). La double articulation linguistique. In Travaux du Cercle Linguistique de Copenhague 5. 30-37.

Martinet, A. (1960). Éléments de linguistique générale. Paris: Libraire Armand Colin.

McGregor, W. M. (1997). Semiotic Grammar. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Peirce, C. S. (1903). Syllabus of certain topics of logic. Boston: Alfred Mudge & Son.

 

The Lingivstiska Samlarbilder were taken from Mikael Parkvall’s collection. We kindly thank him for permission to use them.

 

 

About to start

Fuzzy Grammar is Jeroen Willemsen and Tobias Gretenkort, two students with a somewhat different concept of ‘time off’.

Fuzzy Grammar will feature anything linguistic or semiotic, and anything that straddles the border between the two. Some recurring topics will include theoretical topics in either discipline, the sign as a concept, interviews with outstanding people and linguistic description/fieldwork. The posts are long but the rewards are significant.

We aim at updating every two weeks. Suggestions for improvement as well as guest posts are welcome (click on contact us).

Yours truly,

Fuzzy Grammar

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